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We examine the e⁄ect of collective rights organizations (CROs) on
upstream innovation. CROs are established to facilitate downstream
use, such as production and downstream innovation, of upstream in-
tellectual property. We compare CROs with two alternative royalty
redistribution rules, two di⁄erent upstream innovation environments
and two di⁄erent anti-trust rules. Most CROs increase upstream R&D
incentives by increasing licensing pro￿t but this may lead to over-
investment. We observe that when the market is ex-ante asymmetric
(only one ￿rm has ability to develop one of the technologies), unequal
royalty distribution in favor of the one ￿rm may be ex-post e¢ cient
but may result in under investment in the complementary technology.
Thus in addition to balancing the trade-o⁄between ex-ante (dynamic)
e¢ ciency and ex-post (static) e¢ ciency as in the case of a single intel-
lectual property, CROs must achieve the balance among members.
￿We thank Jay Pil Choi, Yann Maniere, Stephen Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer for
very helpful comments, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for ￿nan-
cial support. The paper was formerly called ￿Intellectual Property Clearinghouses and
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1 Introduction
Collective rights organizations (CROs, Merges 1996) license multiple up-
stream intellectual property (IP) rights jointly to avoid the ￿tragedy of the
anticommons￿(Heller & Eisenberg 1998, Buchanan & Yoon 2000). By de￿n-
ition they promote use of IP, either for production or downstream innovation.
The focus of this paper is how CROs will in￿ uence upstream innovation. For
example, how will the anti-trust and revenue allocation rules of the MPEG
group e⁄ect innovation of video ￿les in the long run? Is ASCAP good for
the long term development of the music industry? These are the questions
we address.
It is a well recognized that there is potential for ￿tragedy of the anticom-
mons￿in, for example, development of a new medical genetic diagnostic test
that require licensing multiple patented inventions, owned by di⁄erent inven-
tors, related to gene sequences, gene expression technologies, and so on (Van
Overwalle et al 2006, OECD 2002). This may retard downstream innovation
and/or lead to end-users paying high prices for downstream products. As
well as genetics, similar situations can also arise in information technology
and communications industries, for example (Shapiro 2001, Aoki and Na-
gaoka 2005). In response to these licensing ine¢ ciencies, a number of CROs
and other arrangements have emerged or been promoted, including patent
pools, cross-licensing, copyright collectives, and third-party clearinghouses
(Shapiro 2001, van Zimmeren et al 2006, Aoki and Schi⁄ 2008).
Our analysis shows that in addition to the usual trade-o⁄between static
and dynamic e¢ ciency of optimal IP design, there is a trade-o⁄ involving
allocation of licensing revenues among CRO members. The trade-o⁄ among
members depends on two factors: if the technologies are complements or
substitutes, and the number of upstream ￿rms. In particular, a ￿rm may
￿nd it pro￿table to give up some of its share of CRO licensing revenue in
order to provide incentive to ￿rms that are able to invent a complementary
technology. A CRO with a unequal distribution rule will allow the ￿rm to
commit to share its revenue. This occurs when there is a ￿rm that has a
2unique ability to develop a technology while there are many competing ￿rms
that can develop a complementary technology, i.e., ex-ante the innovation
process is asymmetric.
We use a simple product innovation framework where a downstream
use requires the development of two complementary upstream components.
A number of upstream research ￿rms can invest in developing these com-
ponents, and each has some probability of success. When multiple ￿rms
invest, there is some chance that multiple substitute versions of either or
both components will be developed independently. All successful innovators
earn revenues by licensing their innovations to downstream users. After re-
search ￿rms invest and the outcome of the innovation process is realized,
each successful inventor can choose to license independently, or join a CRO
that licenses on behalf of its members. The CRO sets a single royalty to
maximize the joint pro￿ts of its members.
We evaluate several di⁄erent modes of operation for the CRO relating to
its royalty distribution scheme and anti-trust policy. Antitrust policy either
does or does not allow the CRO to license substitute innovations jointly.
The CRO may also distribute royalty revenues equally or unequally among
its members according to whether they are the sole inventor of a component
or whether there are substitutes for a component. Ex-post, we show that
banning licensing of substitutes can generate the same welfare level as not
banning but permitting the CRO to use an unequal redistribution rule. In
addition, an unequal redistribution rule can perform better than an equal
redistribution rule as it can ensure that sole inventors of a component do not
prefer to license independently from the CRO. However, unless licensing of
substitutes is banned, a CRO may reduce ex-post welfare if both components
have multiple substitutes.
The ex-post licensing pro￿ts determine the ex-ante incentives to inno-
vate. We consider two ex-ante ￿market structures￿to compare the ex-ante
performance of CROs with di⁄erent rules. We ￿rst consider a symmetric
market where there are a large number of competitive research ￿rms that
have the ability to develop each component. This may be interpreted as
the two components themselves are symmetric. The second market we ana-
lyze is asymmetric in that one component is unique and a single ￿rm has the
ability to develop it while the other component has many possible inventors.
We ￿nd that CROs usually increase ex-ante incentives to invest in up-
3stream R&D, as the expected ex-post pro￿t gains from joint licensing always
outweigh any losses from royalty sharing. A possible exception is when one
component can only be developed by one ￿rm and the CRO is permitted to
license substitutes jointly. In this case the unique inventor only bene￿ts from
the CRO if the other component has a single inventor, which occurs with
relatively high probability only when investment in the other component is
relatively low. Further, since the CRO increases ex-post pro￿ts of inventors
of substitute components, it increases investment in such components, and
thus is more likely to make the unique inventor worse o⁄.
CROs may also increase or decrease ex-ante expected welfare. We show
that a CRO that distributes royalties unequally can always generate higher
expected welfare for a given level of investment than no CRO, as it can
achieve participation of all successful innovators and solve the ￿anticom-
mons￿ ine¢ ciencies without introducing excessive anticompetitive distor-
tions ex-post. In the symmetric investment market structure, this means
that an unequal CRO that can license substitutes jointly is equivalent to
a CRO that is not permitted to license substitutes jointly. Thus unequal
redistribution rules can replace anti-trust rules without a⁄ecting welfare. In
contrast, a CRO that distributes royalties equally and can license substitutes
jointly does not always perform better than no CRO for a given investment
level, as it cannot achieve full participation of innovators and may generate
anticompetitive distortions.
These basic welfare comparisons do not take account of the change in the
R&D investment level induced by the CRO. Once investment is made en-
dogenous, an unequal CRO or a CRO that cannot license substitutes jointly
can reduce ex-ante expected welfare if it causes an excessive increase in in-
vestment. We use a numerical simulation based on a binomial innovation
process to compare the equilibrium expected welfare of the di⁄erent CROs
under the di⁄erent innovation markets. In general, a CRO that redistrib-
utes royalties unequally or a CRO that cannot license substitutes jointly
performs better than one that distributes royalties equally and can license
substitutes jointly, except for some relatively small subset of parameter val-
ues. In addition, the CROs tend to perform better than no CRO when costs
of innovation are high, and/or the probability of an inventor￿ s success is low,
as these are the cases where stimulating R&D investment through increased
licensing pro￿ts is most likely to be bene￿cial.
4Shapiro (2001) discusses various types of CROs (excluding clearing-
houses) and how these may be used to mitigate anticommons problems in
licensing. Patent pools in particular have received much attention in the lit-
erature, for example, Lerner and Tirole (2004) examine when patent pools
are e¢ ciency enhancing ex post, and Lerner et al (2007) empirically examine
the types of licensing rules used by patent pools. Layne-Farrar and Lerner
(2008) and Aoki and Nagaoka (2005) examine royalty distribution rules of
patent pools and incentives of patent owners to join pools, which is are is-
sues that also arises in the current paper. Hoppe and Ozdenoren (2005)
examine the role of CROs as intermediaries to reduce informational prob-
lems in licensing markets. In contrast to our paper, all of these papers take
an existing set of intellectual property rights as given. We concentrate on
the e⁄ects of collective licensing on incentives to innovate. Most similar to
our work is Gilbert and Katz (2007) who consider division of pro￿ts among
innovators who are racing to develop complementary components, however
they do not examine collective licensing. In this paper we focus on the ef-
fects of CROs on incentives to invest in upstream R&D for complementary
components and the consequences for economic welfare.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section
we present a simple model of ex-post licensing with a CRO. Then in section 3
we embed this in two di⁄erent upstream ￿innovation markets￿ , and compare
di⁄erent types of CRO in terms of ex-ante expected pro￿ts and welfare. In
section 4 we perform further welfare analysis using numerical simulations
with endogenous investment. Section 5 concludes.
2 E⁄ects of CROs on ex-post licensing
Our model of IP licensing is as follows. There are two complementary com-
ponents or research tools, A and B, that are needed for the production of a
downstream innovation or product. Upstream research ￿rms invest in R&D
to develop these components and earn royalties by licensing their innova-
tions to downstream users. An inventor of either component cannot earn
any royalties unless the other component has also been invented. There are
a large number of research ￿rms, each of which has the capacity to undertake
a single research ￿ project￿at some cost. Research ￿rms are specialized in
the development of A or B. Any research project may result in the invention
5of one of the components or it may be unsuccessful and invent nothing. We
allow for the possibility that perfect substitute versions of either component
may be independently invented by di⁄erent inventors.
A third-party CRO may also exist and can license innovations on behalf
of member inventors. All successful inventors have the option to join the
CRO or license independently. The CRO seeks to maximize the total royalty
revenues of its members from licensing, and distributes these revenues among
its members according to a distribution rule that it announces in advance.
The CRO may also be subject to an anti-trust rule that prohibits it from
jointly licensing substitute innovations.
De￿nition 1 The CRO operates under a strict anti-trust rule if joint li-
censing of substitutes is prohibited.
If a strict anti-trust rule applies and substitute inventors of either compo-
nent have joined the CRO, we assume that the downstream licensee picks one
of the substitute versions at random to license and only the chosen version
receives royalty payments. If the anti-trust rule is not strict, joint licensing
of substitute innovations is permitted and royalties are shared among all
members.
Given this setup, innovation and licensing takes place in four stages:
Stage 1: The anti-trust rule is announced.
Stage 2: The CRO announces a royalty redistribution rule consistent
with the anti-trust rule.
Stage 3: Each research ￿rm decides whether or not to invest in an
R&D project and those that invest invent a component according to their
expertise, with some probability.
Stage 4: Successful inventors simultaneously decide whether or not to
join the CRO or license independently, and then innovations are licensed
by the CRO and/or any independent inventors and royalties are paid by
licensees.
In this section we describe our model of the ￿nal (ex-post) stage of this
process and ￿nd the ex-post equilibrium payo⁄s and welfare.
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium. If both components have
been invented, successful inventors can earn royalties from licensing. Let
￿M denote the total monopoly royalties obtained by licensing all success-
ful inventions of both components jointly and let ￿D denote the duopoly
6royalties each component receives when there is one independent licensor
for each component. Similarly, let WM denote the total welfare level that
arises when both components are licensed jointly, WD denote the welfare
level when the two components are licensed by two independent licensors,
and W0 > WM denote the welfare level when both components are licensed
for zero royalties. Since components A and B are perfect complements, we
make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The ￿ tragedy of the anticommons￿reduces joint pro￿ts and
welfare when the two components are licensed by two independent licensors
compared to when they are licensed jointly: ￿M ￿ 2￿D and WM ￿ WD.
The payo⁄s of successful inventors depend on the redistribution rule of
the CRO and the anti-trust rule. If the anti-trust rule is strict, the CRO
can license at most one innovation for each component. If it licenses innova-
tions for both components, we assume the total royalties are shared equally
between the two speci￿c innovations licensed by the CRO to downstream
users.
If the anti-trust rule is not strict, the CRO licenses all the innovations
of its members jointly and shares royalty revenues among all members. In
this case we consider two di⁄erent policies:
De￿nition 2 An equal CRO distributes its royalty revenues equally among
its members. If the CRO earns ￿ and has n members, each member receives
￿=n.
De￿nition 3 An unequal CRO distributes disproportionate royalty revenues
to a member (if any) who is the sole successful inventor of a component when
the other component is competitive. If the CRO earns ￿ and one component
has a single inventor and the other component has n ￿ 2 inventors, the






. In all other situations, the CRO distributes revenues
equally among its members.
There are three cases where downstream production is possible:
Case ￿ MM￿ : Both components have a single successful inventor;
Case ￿ MC￿ : One component has a single inventor and the other com-
ponent has two or more substitute (competitive) inventors; and
7Case ￿ CC￿ : Both components have two or more substitute inventors.
In cases MC and CC, inventors of a competitive component cannot earn
any royalties unless they all join a CRO, since competition between them
will drive royalties down to zero. Thus such inventors always join the CRO.
In cases MM and MC a monopoly inventor of a component may or may
not want to join the CRO. In case MM, if both inventors license indepen-
dently they each receive ￿D, while if both join any type of CRO they receive
￿M=2. If one inventor joins the CRO but the other does not, the situation is
e⁄ectively the same as where both do not join, and both receive ￿D. There-
fore, by Assumption 1, both successful inventors have a weakly dominant
strategy to join a CRO in case MM.
In case MC, suppose the competitive component has n inventors. Under
a strict anti-trust rule, the CRO can license at most one invention of the
competitive component together with the sole invention of the other com-
ponent. Thus the inventor of the monopoly component receives ￿M=2 from
joining the CRO and ￿D from not joining, so the monopoly inventor will join.
If the anti-trust rule is not strict, the monopoly inventor will join an equal
CRO if ￿M=(n + 1) ￿ ￿D and will join an unequal CRO if z￿M ￿ ￿D. To
di⁄erentiate equal and unequal CROs, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 A monopoly inventor of a component does not join an equal
CRO when there are n ￿ 2 inventors of the other component, but does join
an unequal CRO. That is, ￿M ￿ 3￿D and z ￿ ￿D=￿M.1
We can now summarize the equilibrium payo⁄s of successful inventors in
stage 4, in each of the three ex post cases above. Let ￿MM be the royalties
that a successful inventor receives in case MM, let ￿M
MC be the royalties that
the monopoly inventor receives in case MC, let ￿C
MC (n) be the royalties
that a successful inventor of the competitive component receives in case MC
when there are n ￿ 2 inventors of that component, and let ￿CC (nA;nB) be
the royalties that a successful inventor receives in case CC when there are
nA ￿ 2 and nB ￿ 2 successful inventors of A and B respectively.
Table 1 shows the values of these payo⁄s for di⁄erent types of CRO. In
comparison with no CRO, an equal CRO increases an inventor￿ s royalties
if there are multiple inventors of the same component, or if there is only
1Such a value of z achieves the CRO￿ s objective of maximising the total royalties of its
members, since it ensures that the total CRO royalties are ￿M.
8CRO Type ￿MM ￿M
MC ￿C
MC (n) ￿CC (nA;nB)
None ￿D ￿M 0 0
Equal (not strict) ￿M=2 ￿D ￿D=n ￿M=(nA + nB)
Unequal (not strict) ￿M=2 z￿M (1 ￿ z)￿M=n ￿M=(nA + nB)
Strict ￿M=2 ￿M=2 1
n￿M=2 1
ni￿M=2; i = A;B
Table 1: Equilibrium payo⁄s of successful inventors under di⁄erent types of
CRO and di⁄erent outcomes of the innovation process.
one inventor of both components. However, such a CRO decreases royalties
from ￿M to ￿D when the inventor is the sole inventor of a component but
the other component is competitive. In this situation, the existence of the
CRO reduces competition among inventors of the competitive component,
which bene￿ts them but harms the sole inventor of the other component.
An unequal CRO increases a successful inventor￿ s royalties compared to
no CRO unless the inventor is the sole inventor of one component while the
other component is competitive. In this case the value of z is su¢ cient to
induce the monopoly inventor to join the CRO, but she is still worse o⁄
compared to when no CRO exists, because the CRO gives some fraction
of ￿M to the competitive inventors of the other component. An unequal
CRO may also make successful inventors better or worse o⁄ compared to an
equal CRO. If, for example, A has a single inventor but B is competitive,
the inventors of B receive ￿D=nB under an equal CRO, but (1 ￿ z)￿M=nB
under an unequal CRO. Since z ￿ ￿D=￿M to attract the inventor of A to
join the unequal CRO, this reduces the payo⁄s of the inventors of B relative
to the equal CRO.
Finally, if the anti-trust rule is strict, the CRO induces all inventors to
join and total ex-post licensing revenues are ￿M, which is the same outcome
as an unequal CRO without a strict anti-trust rule. From Table 1, a CRO
under a strict anti-trust rule makes all inventors better o⁄ compared to no
CRO except the monopoly inventor in case MC (like an unequal CRO).
In cases MC and CC, all inventors of the competitive components join the
CRO, but only one is chosen by the downstream licensor. Thus competitive
licensors receive a payo⁄ of ￿M=2 with probability 1=ni where ni is the
number of inventors of the same component.
Similarly, let WMM, WMC and WCC be the equilibrium welfare levels at-
9CRO Type WMM WMC WCC
None WD WM W0
Equal (not strict) WM WD WM
Unequal (not strict) WM WM WM
Strict WM WM WM
Table 2: Equilibrium ex-post welfare (ignoring sunk investment costs) from
licensing under di⁄erent types of CRO.
tained in the three ex-post cases where production is possible. Table 2 shows
the welfare levels (ignoring R&D costs) that result under each type of CRO
in each case. Compared to no CRO, an equal CRO improves welfare when
both components have a single inventor (case MM), but reduces welfare in
all other cases, as the CRO allows substitute inventors of the same compo-
nent to reduce competition among themselves. An unequal CRO with an
appropriate value of z always attracts all inventors to join, and thus always
achieves the welfare level WM. Compared to no CRO, this increases welfare
in case MM, but reduces welfare when both components have multiple in-
ventors (case CC), and leaves welfare unchanged in case MC. In every case
an unequal CRO generates at least as much welfare as an equal CRO, and
outperforms it in case MC. A CRO under a strict anti-trust rule achieves the
same ex-post outcome as an unequal CRO, as it always induces all successful
inventors to join.
3 E⁄ects of CROs on ex-ante expected pro￿ts and
welfare
In this section we examine and compare CROs under two alternative inno-
vation environments or market structures.
3.1 Investment market 1: All research projects are equal
In this market, each research project costs c and has the same chance of
developing a component or developing nothing. Research ￿rms and projects
are exogenously specialized towards the development of A or B and a large
number of ￿rms are capable of undertaking projects for each component. Let
10NA and NB be the total number of projects undertaken to develop A and B
respectively. The success of any project is independent of that of any other
project. Given that Ni ￿ 1 projects are undertaken for component i = A;B,
the probability that ni ￿ Ni successfully develop the component is denoted
by P (ni;Ni), where
PNi
ni=0 P (ni;Ni) = 1 and limNi!1 P (ni;Ni) = 0 for
all ni 2 f0;1;:::;Nig.
Since the components are identical, we consider symmetric situations
where NA = NB = N, thus 2N projects are undertaken in total. The
expected pro￿t of a research ￿rm given N is denoted ￿ (N). The proba-
bility of case MM and a given research ￿rm is one of the successful ones
is 1
NP (1;N)
2. The probability that a research ￿rm is the sole inventor
of their component while the other component has n ￿ 2 inventors (case
MC, monopoly) is 1
NP (1;N)P (n;N). The probability that a research ￿rm
is one of n ￿ 2 competitive inventors of their component in case MC is
n
NP (n;N)P (1;N). The probability that a research ￿rm is one of m ￿ 2
inventors of their component while the other component has n ￿ 2 inventors
(case CC) is m
NP (m;N)P (n;N). Considering all possibilities under which
the three cases can occur, using the payo⁄ de￿nitions from Table 1, the
expected ex-ante pro￿t of a research ￿rm is
￿ (N) = 1
NP (1;N)
















NP (m;N)P (n;N)￿CC (m;n) ￿ c. (1)
First let us consider the e⁄ect of imposing the strict anti-trust rule on
the CRO. From Table 1, both the unequal CRO and a strict CRO generate
total royalties of ￿M, but the distribution of these royalties among successful
inventors di⁄ers except in case MM. Let ￿UC (N) and ￿SC (N) denote the
expected ex-ante pro￿ts of an inventor under an unequal CRO and a strict
CRO respectively. Substituting the appropriate ex-post payo⁄s from Table 1
















































Note that ￿UC (N) is independent of z, due to the symmetry of research
projects. Comparing ￿UC (N) and ￿SC (N) gives the following result.
Proposition 1 Given N, expected pro￿t of a research ￿rm is identical un-
der an unequal CRO with a not strict anti-trust rule, and a CRO with a
strict anti-trust rule: ￿UC (N) = ￿SC (N) for all N ￿ 1.





























Proposition 1 says that, in spite of the di⁄erent ex-post distributions
of revenues, an unequal CRO with no anti-trust restrictions generates the
same expected pro￿ts to inventors as a CRO that is prohibited from jointly
licensing substitutes. Equilibrium investment levels will therefore be the
same under these two regimes.
Similarly, let ￿NC (N) and ￿EC (N) be a research ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿t
under no CRO and an equal CRO respectively. Recall from Table 1 that
the existence of a CRO potentially involves both ex post gains and losses
for research ￿rms depending on the outcome of the innovation process. The
following proposition shows that, in terms of ex-ante expected pro￿ts, the
gains always outweigh the losses, for any given N.
Proposition 2 Given N, the expected pro￿t of a research ￿rm is highest
with an unequal (or strict) CRO and lowest with no CRO, that is, ￿UC (N) =
￿SC (N) ￿ ￿EC (N) ￿ ￿NC (N) for all N ￿ 1.
Proof. Substituting payo⁄s from Table 1 into (1), ￿UC (N) ￿ ￿EC (N)
if P (1;N)
PN
n=2 P (n;N)[￿M ￿ 2￿D] ￿ 0, which is true by Assumption










m+nP (m;N)P (n;N)￿M ￿ 0, which is also true by Assump-
tion 1. Finally, ￿EC (N) ￿ ￿NC (N) if f (N)￿M ￿ g (N)2￿D where
g (N) = P (1;N)












Since ￿M ￿ 2￿D and f (N) ￿ g (N), we have ￿EC (N) ￿ ￿NC (N) if f (N) ￿












with R(n;N) = P (n;N)=P (1;N), and this last inequality can be rewritten
as
hPN
n=2 R(n;N) ￿ 1
i2
￿ 0, which is true.
Since research ￿rms are competitive, the equilibrium number of projects,
N￿, satis￿es ￿ (N￿) ￿ 0 and ￿ (N￿ + 1) < 0. Introducing any type of CRO
thus generates greater incentive to invest in R&D, for a given level of per-
project costs.
Using the welfare de￿nitions from Table 2, ex-ante expected total welfare
as a function of N is
W (N) = P (1;N)









P (m;N)P (n;N)WCC ￿ 2Nc. (4)
Let WNC (N), WEC (N), WUC (N) and WSC (N) be the total expected
welfare with no CRO, an equal CRO, an unequal CRO and a strict CRO
respectively. From Table 2 it is obvious that WUC (N) = WSC (N) for all
N. The following proposition examines the expected welfare change from
introducing a CRO.
Proposition 3 Given N, expected welfare with an unequal CRO (or a strict
CRO) is always higher than that with an equal CRO: WUC (N) = WSC (N) ￿
13WEC (N) for all N ￿ 1. In addition, expected welfare with no CRO is high-
est when N is su¢ ciently large but lowest when N is small: WUC (N) =
WSC (N) ￿ WEC (N) ￿ WNC (N) for su¢ ciently small N, and WNC (N) ￿
WUC (N) = WSC (N) ￿ WEC (N) for su¢ ciently large N.
Proof. From Table 2 it is clear that WUC (N) ￿ WEC (N) since WM ￿ WD.
From Table 2 and (4), WUC (N) ￿ WNC (N) if
P (1;N)





P (m;N)P (n;N)[W0 ￿ WM].
Since
PN
n=2 P (n;N) = 1 ￿ P (0;N) ￿ P (1;N), this can be rewritten as
￿







The right-hand side of this inequality is positive since W0 ￿ WM ￿ WD.
If N = 1 the left-hand side equals zero since P (0;1) + P (1;1) = 1, so
WUC (1) > WNC (1). At higher values of N, the left-hand side eventually
becomes arbitrarily large, since limN!1 P (n;N) = 0 for all n, thus for
su¢ ciently large N this inequality does not hold and WUC (N) < WNC (N).


















which can be rewritten as
P (1;N)[2P (0;N) + 3P (1;N) ￿ 2]





The right-hand side is positive while the left-hand side is arbitrarily large
at N = 1 and converges to zero as N increases. Thus WEC (1) > WNC (1),
and WEC (N) ￿ WNC (N) for su¢ ciently large N.
Intuitively, an unequal (or strict) CRO always generates more welfare
than an equal CRO because, given that both components are invented, it
guarantees that the welfare level with a single licensor, WM, is achieved,
while the equal CRO only achieves WD ￿ WM in case MC. However, no
CRO outperforms all types of CRO when N is large. This is because when N
is large, the most likely outcome is case CC and, with no CRO, competition
among inventors drives royalties for both components to zero, achieving the
14highest possible welfare level, W0. Similarly, no CRO generates low welfare
levels relative to any type of CRO when N is low, because then it is more
likely that both components have a single licensor and thus joint licensing
through a CRO achieves WM instead of WD.
Propositions 2 and 3 also imply that there is a potential tradeo⁄in terms
of the equilibrium e⁄ects of a CRO on expected welfare once changes in in-
vestment are taken into account. Even if welfare increases given N, it is
not guaranteed to increase once the increase in investment caused by intro-
ducing a CRO is taken into account, since R&D is costly. Without making
additional assumptions it is impossible to solve the zero-pro￿t condition
on (1) to determine the equilibrium R&D investment. We therefore use a
numerical simulation model in section 4 to examine this tradeo⁄ further.
There may also be a con￿ ict between the incentives of existing intellec-
tual property owners and research ￿rms who have not yet invested, in terms
of their willingness to use and support a CRO. For example, Table 1 shows
that if case MC arises, the monopoly inventor is made worse o⁄ by the exis-
tence of any type of CRO relative to when there is no CRO. Sole successful
inventors of an essential component may thus be reluctant to use a CRO if
it means that they have to share some royalties with competitive inventors
of another component. On the other hand, Proposition 2 showed that the
ex-ante expected pro￿t of a research ￿rm in this model is always increased
by the creation of a CRO. Thus innovators who have not yet invested are
more likely to support the creation of the CRO, even if, ex post, there is
some chance that they will be made worse o⁄ by its existence. In addition,
ex-ante, imposing a strict anti-trust rule has no e⁄ect on innovators relative
to an unequal CRO, but it increases expected pro￿ts relative to an equal
CRO. Thus inventors may actually prefer that anti-trust conditions are im-
posed on the CRO if it redistributes royalties equally, although successful
inventors in case CC may be made worse o⁄ by prohibiting joint licensing.
3.2 Investment market 2: Component A is unique
The above analysis showed that ex-post asymmetries between research ￿rms
can be important, even though all ￿rms are symmetric ex-ante. In this
version of the model we investigate the e⁄ects of asymmetry further, by
imposing it at the research stage. We assume that a single research ￿rm
(￿ ￿rm A￿ ) has the unique ability to develop component A. We assume its
15success is deterministic, and it can develop A for certain if it invests cA. As
before, there are also competitive research ￿rms that each can undertake
one research project to try to develop B at a cost of cB. Given that N
projects are undertaken by these component B ￿rms, the probability that n
of them are successful is P (n;N). We let ￿A (N) denote ￿rm A￿ s expected
pro￿t given that it invests and given that N projects invest in component
B, and let ￿B (N) denote the expected pro￿t of an individual project aimed
at developing B given that ￿rm A invests.
Of the three licensing cases considered earlier, only MM and MC are
possible in this model. Given that ￿rm A invests, the probability of case
MM is P (1;N) and the probability of case MC is P (n;N) for n ￿ 2. Thus
￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿t is




MC ￿ cA. (5)
The following proposition compares CROs when a strict anti-trust rule is
not imposed, in terms of ￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿ts.
Proposition 4 Given N, Firm A￿ s expected pro￿t is always higher under
an unequal CRO compared to an equal CRO when Assumption 2 holds. In
addition, ￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿t is highest with no CRO for relatively high
values of N, but is highest with an unequal CRO for relatively low values
of N. That is, ￿NC
A (N) ￿ ￿UC
A (N) ￿ ￿EC
A (N) for su¢ ciently high N and
￿UC
A (N) ￿ ￿EC
A (N) ￿ ￿NC
A (N) for su¢ ciently low N.
Proof. From Table 1 and (5), ￿UC
A (N) ￿ ￿EC
A (N) if
[1 ￿ P (0;N) ￿ P (1;N)](z￿M ￿ ￿D) ￿ 0
which is true for all N under Assumption 2. Similarly ￿UC









The right-hand side of this expression is positive by assumption. The left-
hand side is arbitrarily large when N = 1, so ￿UC
A (1) ￿ ￿NC
A (1). As N
increases, the left-hand side converges to zero, since limN!1 P (n;N) =
0 for all n, thus for su¢ ciently large N, ￿UC
A (N) < ￿NC
A (N). Finally,
￿EC
A (N) ￿ ￿NC
A (N) if
P (1;N)






16Again the right-hand side is positive and this expression holds at N = 1,
but the left-hand side converges to zero as N increases.
Firm A always prefers an unequal CRO to an equal one provided that
the unequal CRO sets z high enough so that it induces ￿rm A to join ex
post. In comparison to no CRO, ￿rm A prefers a CRO exist only when N is
small and the probability that component B has a single inventor is relatively
large. In that case, ￿rm A bene￿ts from the existence of a CRO because
joint licensing with a single inventor of B increases A￿ s pro￿ts. However, if
B has multiple inventors, competition among them drives the royalty for B
to zero, and ￿rm A is able to appropriate all of the monopoly pro￿ts from
licensing when there is no CRO. If an equal CRO exists, the inventors of
B will license jointly, which hurts ￿rm A, while if an unequal CRO exists,
￿rm A also joins, but has to share some royalties with the inventors of B.
In either case, ￿rm A is worse o⁄ compared to when no CRO exits.
In terms of the anti-trust rule, from Table 1 it is clear that ￿rm A always
prefers a CRO under a strict rule to an equal CRO without a strict rule as
it prevents collusive behavior of component B ￿rms and guarantees ￿rm A
an ex-post payo⁄ of ￿M=2. Comparing an unequal CRO to a CRO with a
strict rule, from (5) and Table 1 it is straightforward to verify the following.
Proposition 5 Given N, ￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿t under an unequal CRO
exceeds that of a CRO with a strict anti-trust rule when z ￿ 1
2.
Since both the unequal CRO and the strict CRO get ￿rm A to partici-
pate, the only factor that di⁄erentiates them from ￿rm A￿ s point of view is
the distribution rule of the unequal CRO.











MC (n) ￿ cB. (6)
The following proposition compares CROs in terms of a component B ￿rm￿ s
expected pro￿ts, when a strict anti-trust rule is not imposed.
Proposition 6 For any given N, a research ￿rm that invests in component
B is always better o⁄ under either an equal or unequal CRO compared to no
CRO. Such a ￿rm is better o⁄ under an unequal CRO compared to an equal
CRO if z ￿ 1 ￿ ￿D=￿M.
17Proof. From Table 1 and (6), it is straightforward to verify that the
assumption that ￿M ￿ 2￿D guarantees that ￿EC
B (N) ￿ ￿NC
B (N) and
￿UC
B (N) ￿ ￿NC
B (N) for all N ￿ 1. We also have ￿UC





[1 ￿ P (0;N) ￿ P (1;N)][(1 ￿ z)￿M ￿ ￿D] ￿ 0
which is true provided that z ￿ 1 ￿ ￿D=￿M.
Unlike ￿rm A, having either an equal or unequal CRO (without a strict
anti-trust rule) never makes a component B research ￿rm worse o⁄ because
the ￿rm always gets a strictly higher ex post payo⁄ whatever the outcome
of the random innovation process compared to when there is no CRO in
this model, as shown in Table 1. Whether an unequal CRO is better than
an equal CRO for these ￿rms depends on the fraction of revenues that the
unequal CRO gives to ￿rm A. Both types of CRO give the same payo⁄,
￿M=2, to a component B inventor when he is the only successful inventor
of that component. When there are multiple successful inventors of B, an
equal CRO does not induce ￿rm A to join, so an inventor of B gets ￿D=n.
With an unequal CRO, ￿rm A joins and the CRO revenues rise to ￿M, but
a fraction z is given to ￿rm A to induce it to join. Thus component B
inventors are only better o⁄ relative to an equal CRO if z is not too large.
Note that there is always some range of z that both induces ￿rm A to join
an unequal CRO and makes component B inventors better o⁄ compared
to an equal CRO. This requires z 2 [￿D=￿M;1 ￿ ￿D=￿M], which is always
feasible since ￿D=￿M ￿ 1
2.
If a strict anti-trust rule is imposed, from Table 1 it is clear that com-
ponent B ￿rms prefer a CRO with a strict rule to an equal CRO, since the
strict rule guarantees the participation of ￿rm A in the CRO and generates
higher ex-post pro￿ts for component B ￿rms even though it prevents them
from licensing jointly. However, comparing an unequal CRO without a strict
anti-trust rule to a CRO with a strict anti-trust rule, from (6) and Table 1
it is straightforward to verify:
Proposition 7 Given N, a component B ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿t under an
unequal CRO exceeds that of a CRO with a strict anti-trust rule when z ￿ 1
2.
Comparing propositions 5 and 7, ￿rm A and the component B ￿rms have
opposite preferences in terms of an unequal CRO without a strict anti-trust
rule versus a CRO with a strict anti-trust rule. Both the unequal CRO
18and the strict CRO are able to get ￿rm A to participate. However, if z
is high under the unequal CRO, the competitive component B ￿rms may
actually prefer to be bound by a strict anti-trust rule that prevents them
from licensing jointly, if this gets ￿rm A to participate in the CRO more
￿ cheaply￿than the share that is given to ￿rm A under the unequal CRO.
Combining Propositions 4 and 6, the existence of a CRO increases the
incentive of component B ￿rms to invest in R&D, but may increase or de-
crease ￿rm A￿ s incentive to invest. In addition, if the introduction of a CRO
increases the level of investment by component B ￿rms, this in turn may
increase or decrease ￿rm A￿ s ex-ante pro￿t. Overall, introducing a CRO will
increase investment in component B, but has an ambiguous e⁄ect on ￿rm
A￿ s incentive to invest.
As in the ￿rst market, there may also be a con￿ ict between existing and
potential innovators. For example, if ￿rm A has already invested, it will be
opposed to a CRO if there are multiple inventors of component B even if the
CRO would make ￿rm A better o⁄ ex-ante. In addition, if investment has
not yet taken place, ex-ante ￿rm A may be willing to sacri￿ce some of its
ex post pro￿ts, by supporting an equal CRO or a lower value of z, to give
greater incentive to the component B ￿rms to invest, since A cannot earn
any revenues unless B is also invented. We examine these tradeo⁄s further
numerically in the next section.
The expected welfare given that ￿rm A invests and N ￿ 1 component B
￿rms invest is
W (N) = P (1;N)WMM +
N X
n=2
P (n;N)WMC ￿ cA ￿ NcB. (7)
Proposition 8 Given N, expected welfare is always highest with an unequal
CRO or CRO with a strict anti-trust rule. An equal CRO without a strict
anti-trust rule generates higher welfare compared to no CRO only for su¢ -
ciently low N. That is, WUC (N) = WSC (N) ￿ WEC (N) ￿ WNC (N) for
su¢ ciently low N, and WUC (N) = WSC (N) ￿ WNC (N) ￿ WEC (N) for
high N.
Proof. From Table 2 and (7), it is straightforward to show that WM ￿ WD
implies WUC (N) ￿ WEC (N) and WUC (N) ￿ WNC (N) for all N ￿ 1.
Since the strict and unequal CROs always give the same ex-post outcomes,
19we also have WUC (N) = WSC (N). Finally, WEC (N) ￿ WNC (N) if
[2P (1;N) + P (0;N) ￿ 1][WM ￿ WD] ￿ 0.
This is true at N = 1 since P (1;1)+P (0;1) = 1 and WM ￿ WD. However
the ￿rst bracket converges to ￿1 as N becomes large, thus WEC (N) <
WNC (N) for su¢ ciently large N.
In this market the unequal CRO or a CRO with a strict anti-trust rule
always does best in terms of expected welfare. This is because with a unique
inventor for component A, a situation in which there are multiple inventors
of both components never arises, and the ex post welfare level W0 is never
achieved. Thus since the unequal CRO or strict CRO guarantees the welfare
level WM, it always performs better than either no CRO or an equal CRO.
On the other hand, an equal CRO without a strict anti-trust rule only
outperforms no CRO if N is low so that the chance that component B has a
single inventor is relatively high. When N is large, it is relatively likely that
competition among inventors of B will drive the royalty for that component
to zero, resulting in welfare level WM with no CRO. However, an equal CRO
permits substitute inventors of B to reduce competition, resulting in welfare
of WD.
Finally, as in model 1, these rankings of expected pro￿ts and welfare take
the level of investment in R&D as given. While an unequal CRO or CRO
with a strict anti-trust rule always results in the highest expected welfare
level given N, once the change in investment induced by the CRO is taken
into account, the e⁄ect on welfare is unclear. The next section investigates
further by simulation.
4 Endogenous investment: Simulation analysis
Here we use numerical simulations of our two innovation market structures
to investigate further some of the tradeo⁄s that were identi￿ed.2 For the
simulation we assume total demand for licenses from both components is
linear and is given by Q = 100 ￿ ￿ where Q is the number of licenses sold
and ￿ is the total per-unit royalty for licensing both A and B. Under this
assumption, the royalty revenue of licensor i setting a royalty of ri is Ri =
2Simulations were programmed in R 2.6.0 for Windows, and source codes are available
from the authors on request.






Table 3: Simulation parameters with linear demand for licensing.
(100 ￿ ￿)ri where ￿ =
P
ri, and total welfare generated by licensing is W =
50(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿). When there is a single licensor, ￿ is chosen to maximize
(100 ￿ ￿)￿, which gives ￿M = 1
2. Under duopoly, it is straightforward to
show that the noncooperative equilibrium total royalty is ￿D = 2
3. These
give the parameter values shown in Table 3, which satisfy Assumption 1. To




. We also assume
that the random investment processes are binomial, with the probability of
success of any given project given by ￿, thus




4.1 Market 1 simulations
The key question from market 1 is the e⁄ect of a CRO on equilibrium invest-
ment in R&D and hence the expected equilibrium welfare level. For each
pair of the parameters c and ￿, we simulated the equilibrium investment
level by evaluating (1) under each type of CRO and numerically searching
for the highest level of N at which ￿ (N) ￿ 0 and ￿ (N + 1) < 0. Since
the probability that any individual project is successful tends to zero as N
becomes large, ￿ (N) eventually approaches ￿c under all CRO types. Thus
provided that ￿ (N) > 0 for some relatively low values of N, an equilib-
rium with investment in both components exists. Otherwise, we record the
equilibrium as N = 0, representing no investment.
Recall that in market 1, ex-ante expected pro￿ts and welfare are identical
under a CRO with a strict anti-trust rule and an unequal CRO without a
strict rule for any given N. Thus for each combination of c and ￿, the
equilibrium search was repeated assuming no CRO, an equal CRO and an
unequal CRO, and the equilibrium level of investment N￿ was recorded in
each case.3 Under each type of CRO, the welfare level at N￿ was calculated
by evaluating (4).
3Note also that in market 1 with an unequal CRO, it is straightforward to show that






























































Figure 1: Illustration of a single simulation of model 1, for c = 2:5 and
￿ = 0:7. The left plot shows expected pro￿ts of a research ￿rm given that
N projects are undertaken for each component, under each type of CRO.
The right plot shows expected welfare as a function of N. The large dots
are the equilibrium welfare levels.
Figure 1 illustrates a single simulation of market 1, for c = 2:5 and
￿ = 0:7. The left panel shows the expected pro￿t of an individual research
￿rm under each type of CRO as a function of N. As in Proposition 2,
introducing a CRO increases expected pro￿t for all N. In this particular
case, there is very little di⁄erence in expected pro￿t between an equal and an
unequal (or strict) CRO. Under no CRO, the equilibrium investment level is
N = 2, while under an equal or unequal CRO it is N = 4. The right panel
plots expected welfare as a function of N under each type of CRO, and the
large dots show the equilibrium expected welfare levels.
In this case, the increase in equilibrium investment from N = 2 to N = 4
would increase expected equilibrium welfare if the CRO had no e⁄ect on ex
post licensing. However, once changes in ex post royalties are taken into
account, introducing any type of CRO reduces equilibrium expected welfare
for these parameter values.
Table 4 shows the simulated equilibrium investment levels in market 1
for various values of ￿ and c for di⁄erent types of CRO. Again re￿ ecting
Proposition 2, introducing a CRO increases the investment level, and in-
vestment under an unequal (or strict) CRO is weakly greater than that
under an equal CRO. As well as increasing the investment level, the CRO
can make investment pro￿table when it would otherwise not be, such as for
22￿
CRO 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
c = 2
No 0 0 0 2 3 2 2 2 2
E 0 0 0 5 5 6 6 6 6
U/S 0 0 0 5 6 6 6 6 6
c = 4
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3
U/S 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3
c = 6
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
U/S 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Table 4: Simulated equilibrium investment levels in market 1. ￿ No￿ : No
CRO, ￿ E￿ : Equal CRO, ￿ U/S￿ : Unequal or strict CRO.
c = 4 and ￿ = 0:6.
Table 5 shows the equilibrium welfare levels corresponding to these in-
vestment levels. Introducing a CRO raises welfare provided that the ad-
ditional investment is bene￿cial relative to its costs, and that any ex-post
licensing ine¢ ciencies are not too large. The CRO is obviously always ben-
e￿cial in cases where there is positive investment with a CRO but no invest-
ment without a CRO. In other cases, however, the CRO may reduce welfare.
The results indicate that this is most likely to happen if c is low, so that
a CRO induces a large increase in investment that does not bring su¢ cient
bene￿ts to o⁄set the costs. A CRO is also likely to reduce welfare when ￿ is
high, in which case it is likely that there are multiple competing successful
inventors and the ex-post licensing ine¢ ciencies of having a CRO are large.
23￿
CRO 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
c = 2
No 0 0 0 5:44 18:47 17:84 24:34 30:68 36:64
E 0 0 0 8:55 12:72 12:51 13:25 13:47 13:50
U/S 0 0 0 11:89 12:34 13:19 13:45 13:50 13:50
c = 4
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 5:61 9:78 14:50
E 0 0 0 0 0 7:10 11:05 11:23 12:91
U/S 0 0 0 0 0 10:46 15:05 12:90 13:43
c = 6
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5:78 10:50
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 6:38 12:00 18:38
U/S 0 0 0 0 0 0 6:38 12:00 12:75
Table 5: Simulated equilibrium welfare levels in market 1. ￿ No￿ : No CRO,
￿ E￿ : Equal CRO, ￿ U/S￿ : Unequal or strict CRO.
4.2 Market 2 simulations
Simulations of market 2 were conducted in a similar manner as for market 1.
In market 2, for there to be some probability of production, ￿rm A and at
least one component B ￿rm must both invest. Using (5) and (6) we search for
the largest value of N where ￿A (N) ￿ 0, ￿B (N) ￿ 0 and ￿B (N + 1) < 0.
As in market 1, the expected pro￿t of a component B ￿rm converges to
￿cB as N becomes large, thus an equilibrium with investment occurs if
￿B (N) ￿ 0 and ￿A (N) ￿ 0 for some relatively small N. As well as the
parameters from Table 3, the other parameters in market 2 are cA, cB, ￿ and
z. For the simulations we ￿x cA and allow cB to vary. Unlike in market 1,
the asymmetry between the component A and B research ￿rms means that
z has an e⁄ect on the expected pro￿ts of all research ￿rms under an unequal
CRO.
Figure 2 illustrates a single simulation of market 2, for some particular



























































































Figure 2: Illustration of a single simulation of model 2, for cA = 8, cB = 1:3,
￿ = 0:5 and z = 0:75. The left plot shows expected pro￿ts of ￿rm A. The
middle plot shows the expected pro￿t of a component B research ￿rm. The
right plot shows expected welfare as a function of N and the large dots are
the equilibrium welfare levels. Note that the expected welfare curves for an
unequal CRO and a strict CRO are identical, but the equilibrium welfare
levels are di⁄erent.
an equal CRO, an unequal CRO and a CRO with a strict anti-trust rule
respectively. In this illustration, z > 1￿￿D=￿M and z > 1
2, so this ordering
of investment levels re￿ ects Propositions 6 and 7. In all of these four cases,
the expected pro￿t of ￿rm A at N￿ is positive, so it invests. For these
parameter values, expected equilibrium welfare is highest with an unequal
CRO. However, an equal CRO or a strict CRO reduces expected welfare
compared to no CRO as they stimulate too much investment in component
B.
As noted above, the value of z under an unequal CRO is not neutral in
this market, in contrast with market 1 where the research ￿rms are sym-
metric. Given any N ￿ 2, a higher value of z increases the expected pro￿t
of ￿rm A and reduces the expected pro￿t of a component B research ￿rm.
Figure 3 illustrates this tradeo⁄ by showing ￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿t and
expected equilibrium welfare as functions of z, taking account of the equi-
librium investment in component B, for some speci￿c values of cA, cB and
￿. The discrete steps observed in the results correspond to di⁄erent discrete
























































































































Figure 3: Firm A￿ s expected equilibrium pro￿t and expected equilibrium
welfare under an unequal CRO as a function of z, for cA = 5 and cB = 3.
When the probability of success for component B ￿rms (￿) is low, Figure
3 shows that expected pro￿ts and welfare generally decline as z increases.
With low ￿, equilibrium investment in component B is low, while equilibrium
welfare is increasing in N provided that cB is not too large, since additional
investment raises the probability that component B is invented. In this
case, increasing z reduces investment in component B and reduces expected
welfare. Reduced investment in component B also negatively a⁄ects ￿rm A
in this case as it can only earn pro￿ts if component B is also invented. Thus
when ￿ is low, ex-ante ￿rm A prefers a low value of z as this stimulates
investment in component B, even though it may reduce ￿rm A￿ s ex post
licensing pro￿ts.
At higher values of ￿, Figure 3 shows that equilibrium expected pro￿ts
of ￿rm A and welfare may be increasing and then decreasing in z. Again
increasing z reduces investment in component B under an unequal CRO.
However, this may increase welfare if ￿ is su¢ ciently high, since the cost
savings from reduced investment can outweigh the reduced probability that
component B is invented. Indeed, if ￿ is very high then expected welfare and
￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿t maximized by setting z = 1. In such a situation,
investment in B is low since research ￿rms only get a return if they are the
sole successful inventor, but the high probability of success means that this
does not have a large adverse e⁄ect on ￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿ts or expected
welfare.
26Table 6 shows the simulated equilibrium investment levels of component
B ￿rms in market 2 for di⁄erent values of ￿ and c, under di⁄erent types of
CRO. As in market 1, introducing a CRO increases equilibrium investment
levels. Higher values of z under the unequal CRO discourage investment
by component B ￿rms, while a CRO under a strict anti-trust rule promotes
relatively high levels of investment even though it prevents component B
￿rms from licensing together.
Table 7 shows the simulated equilibrium welfare levels corresponding to
the investment levels from Table 6. As in market 1, introducing a CRO
may or may not be welfare-enhancing. However, a CRO is welfare-reducing
in relatively fewer parameter cases under this market. The biggest welfare
gains occur when the cost of R&D is high or the probability of innovation
success is low. Re￿ ecting Figure 3, welfare performance depends on the
value of z under an unequal CRO, and higher z can improve welfare relative
to an equal CRO or a strict CRO if the latter two types of CRO lead to
excessive investment by component B ￿rms. In addition, an equal CRO
performs relatively poorly compared to the other types of CRO. If the value
of z can be speci￿cally tailored to industry conditions, an unequal CRO
generally has the best performance. Otherwise, a CRO with a strict anti-
trust rule generally performs better than an equal CRO without requiring
detailed knowledge of the underlying parameters.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the results of simulating the optimal value of
z that maximises expected equilibrium welfare (shown by open circles) and
￿rm A￿ s expected equilibrium pro￿t (shown by grey dots), for di⁄erent values
of cB and ￿, ￿xing cA = 5. In terms of welfare, there is generally a range
of z that is optimal for any given parameter values. This is because small
changes in z do not change the equilibrium number of projects invested in
component B, and hence equilibrium welfare does not change. The welfare
maximising range of z increases as ￿ increases and decreases as cB increases.
A higher value of z reduces the payo⁄ of component B ￿rms. Higher ￿
means that component B ￿rms are more likely to be successful, while higher
cB means that investing in B is more costly. Thus when ￿ increases the
socially optimal policy is to reduce z to prevent over-investment in B, while
a reduction in z is needed to incentivise investment in B when cB increases.
Note that when cB is large (e.g. cB = 7 in the ￿gure), all feasible values
of z are optimal from both a welfare point of view and ￿rm A￿ s point of
27view. This is because, for these parameter values, equilibrium investment
in component B is N = 1 even if z is very small, so the unequal distribution












































































Figure 4: Results of simulating the optimal value of z in terms of expected
welfare (open circles) and ￿rm A￿ s expected pro￿ts (grey dots).
The results in Figure 4 also show that ￿rm A may be willing to sacri￿ce
some of its expected pro￿ts, in the form of lower value of z, in order to
incentivise investment in component B. This occurs if ￿ is low or cB is high.
In addition, if ￿ is very high, expected pro￿ts of each component B ￿rm are
low, because it is likely that each will face more competitors. In this case,
￿rm A also prefers a lower value of z.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that CROs can have both positive and negative ef-
fects on ex-ante and ex-post pro￿ts and welfare from licensing innovations.
We showed that CROs typically increase expected pro￿ts from licensing and
thus increase R&D incentives. An exception is when there is a unique po-
tential inventor for one component (our market 2), in which case a CRO
may reduce that inventor￿ s expected pro￿ts when investment in the other
component is relatively high. Aside from this case, CROs generally increase
incentives to invest in R&D. However, as we showed, this increase in invest-
ment does not always increase ex-ante expected welfare, if the bene￿ts in
28terms of the increased probability that all necessary components are devel-
oped does not outweigh the additional cost of the R&D investment and any
anticompetitive ex post e⁄ects of the CRO.
The possibility that a CRO reduces welfare is particularly acute in the
case where royalties are distributed equally among members. If a CRO does
not have the ability to di⁄erentiate royalty payments to inventors whose
innovations have no substitutes versus payments to those who do have com-
petitive substitutes, the CRO increases expected pro￿ts from R&D but is
likely to reduce expected welfare. Therefore, we reach the policy conclusion
that CROs should be given ￿ exibility in their royalty distribution scheme,
and the royalty distribution should favor inventors of unique components.
Our analysis also showed that the optimal asymmetry of royalty payments
by a CRO varies depending on parameters such as the costs of R&D and
the probability of success. If a CRO spans multiple industries, for example,
it may therefore be appropriate for it to use di⁄erent royalty distribution
arrangements in di⁄erent cases, depending on industry characteristics. Al-
ternatively, imposing a strict anti-trust rule banning joint licensing of sub-
stitutes results in welfare performance as good (in market 1) or almost as
good (in market 2) as an unequal CRO, without requiring speci￿c knowledge
of the underlying parameters.
Finally, our analysis highlighted some potential con￿ icts among di⁄erent
types of inventors in terms of their support for a CRO. CROs are most likely
to be supported by successful inventors of competitive innovations. However,
their support should be viewed with some scepticism, as it is essentially a
collusive device for them. On the other hand, symmetric inventors who
have not yet invested and who all have an equal chance of being successful
are also likely to support a CRO, and this may enhance both pro￿ts and
welfare if it does not induce excessive investment. Opposition to a CRO is
likely to come from successful inventors of a component that does not have
any substitutes, or inventors who have not yet invested but have the unique
ability to develop a crucial component. In either case, an unequal royalty
distribution scheme or anti-trust rules are necessary to earn their support.
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31￿
CRO 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
cB = 2
No 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
E 0 0 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
U (0:45) 0 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
U (0:75) 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S 0 3 5 5 6 6 6 6 6
cB = 4
No 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
U (0:45) 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 3
U (0:75) 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 1
S 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 3 3
cB = 6
No 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
U (0:45) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2
U (0:75) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
S 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
Table 6: Simulated equilibrium investment by component B ￿rms in mar-
ket 2. ￿ No￿ : No CRO, ￿ E￿ : Equal CRO, ￿ U (z)￿ : Unequal CRO, ￿ S￿ : Strict
CRO.
32￿
CRO 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
cB = 2
No 0 0 6:04 10:33 14:26 17:83 21:04 15:22 18:00
E 0 0 12:11 13:13 13:42 13:24 12:99 12:83 12:78
U (0:45) 0 7:30 16:20 18:75 19:91 20:35 20:47 20:50 20:50
U (0:75) 0 0 13:64 18:40 21:81 24:10 25:49 26:20 26:46
S 0 7:30 16:20 19:58 19:91 20:35 20:47 20:50 20:50
cB = 4
No 0 0 0 0 4:89 7:67 10:44 13:22 16:00
E 0 0 0 0 12:69 15:00 16:36 16:78 16:25
U (0:45) 0 0 0 11:00 15:13 18:10 19:49 20:20 20:46
U (0:75) 0 0 0 0 9:75 18:50 21:13 21:00 24:75
S 0 0 0 11:00 15:13 18:50 19:49 20:20 20:46
cB = 6
No 0 0 0 0 0 5:67 8:44 11:22 14:00
E 0 0 0 0 7:75 11:50 15:25 19:00 22:75
U (0:45) 0 0 0 0 7:75 11:50 15:25 19:00 20:13
U (0:75) 0 0 0 0 7:75 11:50 15:25 19:00 22:75
S 0 0 0 0 7:75 11:50 15:25 19:00 20:13
Table 7: Simulated equilibrium welfare levels in market 2 given cA = 5.
￿ No￿ : No CRO, ￿ E￿ : Equal CRO, ￿ U (z)￿ : Unequal CRO, ￿ S￿ : Strict CRO.
33